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Fuels for Future Electric Power
By OLIVER S. YU
HE

dominant energy sources in the United States to

T day are based on hydrocarbons- crude oil, natural
gas, and their derivatives. These fuels are obtained from
limited resources that are being dep leted at an increas
ing rate, .and will likely be exhausted within forty years.
Furthermore, the U. S. is dependent on foreign im
ports for more than a third of these fuels. Experience has
clearly shown that this dependence on energy imports,
particularly from politically uncertain regions such as
Africa and the Middle East, ca n and will damage ou r
national economy and endanger our national security.
To preserve its political and economic well-being, the
nation must protect itself from the possibility of having
its energy supplies interrupted.
Thus, it is not only imperative but also widely ac
cepted that the United States must develop a s trategy for
energy independence to relieve its heavy reliance upon
the world's limited supplies of oil and gas by moving
within the next sever al decades toward a system that is
supplied by other forms of energy. From a geopolitical
point of view, such a strategy will help stabilize world
trade in the presence of a vigorous and cohesive
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries oil
cartel, as well as allow the U.S. to maintain its freedom
of action on the international scene.
Oliver S. Yu is a project manager
on the technical assessment staff at
the Electric Power Research In
stitute, which he joined in 1974
(energy systems modeling
program). He is a council member
of the energy systems group of the
Operations Research Society of
America and a consultant on
systems analysis for Stanford
Research Institute. Dr. Yu received
a BSEE degree from Taiwan Univer
sity and an MS degree in electrical
engineering from Georgia Institute
of Technology. From Stanford
University he holds an MS degree in
statistics and a PhD degree in
operations resea~ch.
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To achieve this trans1t10n toward energy in
dependence the United States is fortunate in having a
number of technicaJ options, but it has relatively few
choices. The options consist of adopting more stringent
and effective energy-conserving practices; stimulating.
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Economists and engineers at the Electric Power
Research Institute have devised and used a program
ming model to explore some ofthe options by which the
United States may realistically move away from its
present heavy dependence on oil and gas to a mpre
diversified energy economy. One aim oftheir model was
to allow for price-induced interfuel substitution and
price-induced energy conservation. The findings of the
study are summarized here. In particular, the author
reports that the present value of benefits from both tht
fast-breeder reactor and coal-based synthetic fuels well
exceeds their anticipated research and development
costs. The direct cost to the United States economy from
a nuclear moratorium is also calculated.
increased production of domestic oil and gas; transfer·
fing a greater portion of the energy demand to the mort
abundant coal and nuclear supplies; and learning to ex·
ploit such underused resources as geothermal power and
waste heat, and such inexhaustible energy sources as
solar radiation and fusion. None of these options by itself
can make a large enough contribution during the neXl
two decades to a void increasing U. S. dependence on im·
ports. The nation, therefore, has the limited choice ri
determining an appropriate combination of existing op·
tions.
Unfortunately, none of the options is free from objec·
tions. For example, conservation of energy and reduction
of waste in energy use are attractive concepts in principle
until one examines in detail the social, technical.
economic, and legal obstacles that abound. Then we fllld
PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY-JUNE 3, 1976
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a polarization of views and m uch room for d isagreement
in the political arena. Expanding domestic production of
energy by any of several means involves its own ob
stacles, licensing delays, and undesirable environmental
consequences. Meanwhile, the hope that solar- or
fusion-produced electricity will be free of many of the ob
jections to coal-fired plants or nuclear reactors must
await the outcome of developments that can provide
more definitive information about the attractiveness and
acceptability of those advanced concepts.
To overcome present difficulties, the United States
will need a diversified research and development
program, but its investment in plants and equipment
will have to be concentrated on two major options that
are realistically available within the next twenty to forty
years: (1) expanding the supplies of energy provided by
nuclear fission and coal, and (2) curtailing the growth of
the demand for oil and gas, partly through conservation
and partly through substitution of coal- and nuclear
fueled electricity and synthetic fuels ·in their place Pur
poseful planning will be necessary to achieve a measure
of energy independence. And we may have to take some
environmental risks in developing our domestic
petroleum, gas, and oil shale resources over the next
decades.
Beginning in the 1990's the United States must
de~-elop a synthetic fuels industry- initially coal-based
fuels such as methane and methanol, then hydrogen
derived from nuclear fission , and eventually perhaps
hydrogen from fusion or solar, or both. I n evaluating
these options, timing is crucial. The fast -breeder reactor
(FBR) is needed as insurance againist high-cost
uranium and coal during a per iod of transition away
from an energy economy based upon oil and gas and
10ward one with a potentia lly infinite resource base.
Either solar or fusion, or the FBR, itself, could eliminate
United States dependence upon scarce natural resources
for energy production in future years.
Recently at the Electric Power Research Institute, my
colleagues Peter Auer, a Cornell University physicist,

a nd Alan Manne, a H arvard political economist, and
m yself conducted a study to examine the implications of
these realistic pathways to energy independence. The
prospective benefits of new technologies, particularly the
fast -breeder reactor and synthetic fuels, were then as
sessed within this framework. Highlights of the results of
the stu dy a re summarized here .

Principal Assumptions
The study uses an economic resource allocation
model. The model is formulated as though all decision
makers had a common objective: to meet the projected
energy demand at minimum discounted costs for capital
investment, fuel, operation, and maintenance over a 75
year planning period. All costs and b enefits are ex
pressed in terms of " real" 1975 dollars. Thus , any price
rises due to general inflation would not affect the
analysis.
I n this analysis, we were concerned primarily with
two secondary forms of energy - electric and non
electric (e.g., liquids and gases). Coal can supply both
the electric and nonelectric sectors either by direct com
bustion or by conversion to synthetic fuels. Nuclear fue ls
may be used ~o generate electricity and also to produce
hydrogen by electrolysis to supply the needs of the non
electric sector. Consequently, there are paths in our
mode l by which either coal or nuclear fuels can meet all
energy demands, with the proportions of their contribu-·
tions being determined by the relative costs of interfuel
substitution.
It should be emphasized that the model used in this
analysis is not a forecasting model, but rather a planning
model by which the consequences of alternative future
energy.-economic sce narios can be examined. For exam
ple, desp ite the fact that recent domestic political
developments have not brought the United States close
to the goals of energy independence , it is a fundamental
assumption of the model that the nation will strive
toward these goals by limiting its future energy imports
to a certain level.
It also should be pointed out that the study is par
ticularly interested in assessing the economic viability of
two major near-term ener gy technologies: coal-based
synthetic fuels and the fast-breeder reactor. For this
reason, the developments of many other technological
options, such as oil shale and the high-temperature gas
cooled reactor, are deliberately assumed to occur at their
potential upper limits rather than at more achievable
lower levels.

Discount Rates
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Figure 1 Electric energy costs

The costs of developing new technologies are incurred
in the near term, but their benefits require a long time to
accrue. Therefore, in order to compare costs and
benefits, it becomes necessary to discount both to their
present values. This is sound economic practice and
provides u seful planning information when the time
span of concern is brief. The practice of discounting ,
however, weighs heavily against benefits when they are
expected to accrue over extended periods. Thus, for ex
29
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Figure 2 Noncle<:lric energy costs

ample, the value of today's dolla r twenty-five years
hence is on ly nine cents, if we use a 10 per cent a nnual
discount rate.
What discount rate, then , is appr opriate for measur
ing the costs a nd benefits of long-range projects? The
present practice of the U .S. Office of Management and
Budget is to use 10 per cent as the discount factor in
federally sponsored energy research and development
project s. But this rate seem s far higher than the real
returns to investors in the private sector of the economy.
F or example, H arvard economists L. R. Christensen and
D . W .J orgenson estimate that the real rate of compensa
tion to property owners was 3 to 5 per cent in the years
1929-69, once allowance was ma d e for the effects of infla
tion on both incomes and wealth . This would imply that ,
for example, a 10 per ce nt nominal discount rate would
be consistent with a 4 per cent ra te in real te rms, coupled
with a 6 per cent inflationary factor . Since the discount
rate s ignificantly affects the selection of future energy
supply mix, we have used two and sometimes three alter
native discount rates (5 per cent, 7.5 per cent, and 10 per
cent, expressed in terms of "constant" dollars) in o rder
to study the sensi tivity of this important factor .

Demarui
In the analysis, the energy demand p rojections a re not
extrapolations of historical trends but are derived in
stead from an economic model that incorpor ates the ef
fects of aggregate national income g rowth and energy
supply price changes. For the latter effects, through the
use of own-price and cross-price elasticities, a higher
price of one energy source would induce conserva tion of
that source and prompt its substitution by another.
Using this model, projections of the demand g rowth
for electric energy could be on the low side because
historically, with consumers' preference for electricity
over other forms of energy, new technological applica
tions of electricity have stimulated increased demand.
However, demand projections calculated for cases
studied in the analysis have all fallen well within the
30

The availability and cost of petroleum, natural gas,
and thei r derivatives {designated here collectively as
PETG ) will h ave profound effects on the benefits of com.
peting energy sources. We assume, for pla nning pur
poses, that a realistic base figure for the ultimately
producible PETG resources in the United States is two
quintillion Btu ( = 2 X 10 18 B tu), corresponding approx
ima tely to a 40-year lifetime supply a t currml domestic
consu m ption ra tes. T his estimate falls well within the
confide nce ra nge of recent official estimates. In order to
test sen sitivity, we also treat the more optimistic case
that the ultimate domes tic PETG r eserves will turn out
to be three quintillion Btu (3Q). In order to simulate a
policy aimed at energy independence, import levels are
h e ld cons ttl nt at 7 million barrels per d ay (oil
equi va lent) even though realistically we recognize
that they are likely to be mo re tha n this in the near term.
As long as resources a re available , it is assumed that
PETG costs will remain constant at the 1975 oil impon
price of S2 p er million Btu. This is m ore than actual
197 5 domestic prices, averaged over the mix of new and
old oil, regulated and unregulated gas. H owever, it
represents a plausible assum ption , unless one is inclined
to believe that OPEC will soon collapse and world oil
prices will plunge.
The magnitude of the u ltimately producible domestic
coal reserves is not at issue because of the limited time
sp an of our planning horizon (only seventy-five years).
What is of some concern, however, is the future rate of
coa l utilization. The rises in the price of coal since 1973
are not assume d to be significant in determining long·
term benefits, but we are largely ignora nt of what shape
the coa l supply c urve would take under conditions where
annual coal production would have to increase ad in·
finitum. Consequently, we have assumed two simple
alternative cases: one in which coal costs remain con·
stant at the c urrent va lue of $1 per million Btu,
indep endent of production volumes; and one in which
the unit costs remai n constant until annual production
reaches twice the current level and thereafter rise linear·
ly with the amount produced. Thus, coal costs would
reach S2 per million Bt u when annual production had
b ecome four times the present level and $3 p er million
Btu at six times the current production volume. (These
cost increases could arise from a variety of factors; for ex·
ample, the need for more stringent environmental con·
trois in the presence of a greater density of coal-burning
plants.) It should not be surprising that the relative
benefits of coal a nd nuclear technologies are quite sen·
sitive to whether coal c osts remain level o r rise with in·
creasing use. This ques tion should be given far more
careful sc rutiny t h an in the past.
It is we ll-known that the projected benefits of ad·
vanced nuclear technologies, whether pluto nium rec~c_le.
high-conversion reactors or breeders, are quite sensttJVr
6
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Electric energy demand and production through the year 2030

to the assumed quantities of uranium fuel available at a
given price. We do not pretend to add any new informa
tion to the often-debated question of how much uranium
of a given richness remains to be discovered and ex
ploited within the United States. Instead, we rely on the
official estimates given by the Energy Research and
Development Administration in its most recent report on
breeder benefits. From this we have extracted a base
case and a "pessimistic" supply curve. The two diO.er in
that the former predicts 5 million short tons of U 3 0 8
available at $100 per pound, while the latter predicts
only 3 million short tons at that cost. One should note,
however, that official figures for identified reserves of
economically recoverable U 3 0 8 are currently quoted at
700,000 short tons.

Technological Options

e

2015

As PETG supplies for the nonelectric energy sector
dwindle, they will be replaced by oil shale, synthetic gas
eous and liquid fuels from coal (SYNF), or hydrogen
produced by electrolysis (EL HY). It can be argued that
biomass derived from solar energy is another source that
should be included in this category, although we have
not done so explicitly.
The development of shale oil products by existing
mining and surface-retorting technology is apt to be
limited by the availability of water and the problems of
disposing of spent shale waste. We have allowed for
shale's initial commercial appearance in 1985, a produc
tion of one million barrels per day (oe) by 1990, and a
constant increase of production by one million barrels
per day (oe) in each five-year period thereafter.
sYNF production could begin to grow significantly in
the early 1990's. We assume it to be available at a cost of
$3 per million Btu, with a conversion efficiency of 6 7 per
cent and a coal cost of $1 per million Btu. Under base
case assumptions, we project the combined output from

shale and SYNF to be eight million barrels per day (oe)
by the year 2000, almost equal to the 1975 levels of
domestic crude oil production.
ELHY is assumed to be available at about $5 per mil
lion Btu, assuming that electrolyzers will achieve I 00 per
cent efficiency and that on an equivalent-energy basis
the value of hydrogen is no different from that of any
other fu el. With these assumptions, ELHY does not
become economically competitive with SYNF until coal
costs rise above $2 per million Btu, or unless the cost of
nuclear base-load electricity is decreased by future
developments. Eventually, thermochemical processes
may lead to reduced costs for hydrogen production. We
do not allow for this explicitly in our calculations,
however, because of the uncertain state of this
technology.
We combine the production of electricity from
geothermal sources and from wind and waste products,
together with hydroelectric generation, and refer to them
all as hydro. I n 1970 this category accounted for 16 per
cent of the electricity genera ted . It is assumed that the
hydro component will grow steadily at 2 per cent an
nually.
Fossi l-fired plants will continue to produce electricity
in the future for at least two reasons. As of 1970, about
45 per cent of these plants used oil or gas. Even if no ad
ditional PETG-consuming plants has been built after
1970, those in service would continue to operate through
their useful lifetimes , thus requiring a significant amoum
of PETG input to the electric sector until the end of the
century. Coa l-fired plants are expected to provide a
minimum of 40 per cent of all new electric energy sup 
plies until the year 2000, in order to accommodate cy:
cling and peak-load requirements. After 2000, it is as
sumed that these requirements can be reduced linearly
to zero in twenty years. By 2020, for example, low-cost
swrage technologies a re likely to become available. This
would then make it economical for nuclear plants to

.6
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2005; and that the number of FBR 's installed will be un. \
limited beyond 2005. Capital costs of the FBR are as
sumed to be S l 00 per kilowatt-electric higher than those
of the LWR, implying that in order for the FBR to be
competitive with the LWR it will be necessary for
uran ium costs to exceed S30 per pound. We assume a
net breeding gain of 4 per cem (corresponding to a sim
ple doubling time of twenty-five years). Any improve
ments in FBR performance or reductions in capital cost
are ascribed to advanced technology (AOV, defined
below). The small breeding gain limits the rate or
breeder introduction, thus making plutonium quite
valuable. We find that its incremental value rises from
S10 per gram in 1985 to $45 per gram in the year 2000.
In order to allow for potential major technological
breakthroughs, we have included an advanced
technology (ADV) category in our model. This may be
solar, fusion, improved breeders, or yet some other ad
vanced technology. Its cost is assumed to be appreciably
less than the FBR used in the model. The only con
straint we place on the ADV is that it appear commer
cially no sooner than twenty years after the F BR.
Cost est imates for these technology options are sum
marized in Figures I and 2 (pages 29 and 30).

meet the cycling and peak loads of a system, in addition
to the base loads.
Light-water reactors (LWR 's) appear at present to
be, on a n<H ional average. the lowest cost plants for base
load generation. Operations with and without
plutonium recycle are included in our model. Our
calculations indicate that stockpiling plutonium for
future breeders is the economically advantageous choice,
providing the FBR becomes available by the year 2000
and its breeding gain is limited to the low value assumed
here. The model also allows for a variation in the tails as
say at which future enrichment plants will operate. We
generally find it preferable to aim for a 0.2 per cent
rather than 0.3 per cent tails assay as uranium ore costs
increase.
The high-temperature gas-cooled reactor ( HTGR )
has been introduced into some of these calculations in
order to test the sensitivity of breeder benefits to the ex
istence of a high-performance converter. Thu s,
somewhat unrealistically, we assume HTGR capital
costs to be equal to those of the L WR and fuel cycle costs
to be only somewha t higher for HTGR than for the
LWR with plutonium recycle. We also as ume the
HTGR can ap pear in substantial numbers commercially
by 1990, a full ten years before the FBR, although at the
moment it still lacks sufficient industrial backing. The
high-temperature advantages of the HTGR for process
heat generation or thermochemical hydrogen production
are not specifically taken into account. Only its potential
advantage in conserving expensive uranium is included
in our analysis.
The FB R assumptions here are decidedly conser
vative. W e postulate that indecision will continue to slow
down the U.S. program and that no significant commer
cial introduction of the FBR will occur before 1995; that
FBR's will constitute no more than 20 per cent of the
new plants installed and operating in the year 2000 and
no more 1han 40 per cent of the new plants installed in

An Example of Transition, Using
Base Case Results
The shift from the present P ET G-dominated energy
economy to one dependent on nuclear or coal, or both,
may occur along various paths. For purposes of illustra
tion, we present one mode of transition, obtained from
the base case calculations. In this case, the uranium sup
ply curve has its nominal value, coal costs are assumed
to rise with increasing use, and the nuclear reactor mix
consists only of LWR 's and FBR's. Figure 3 (page 31)
indicates the gradual transition in electricity generation
from fossil fuels to LWR to FBR to ADV, along with a
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relatively small but steady contribution from hydro
between 1970 and 2030. The units of measure are
quadrillions of Btu, or quads (I quad =one-thousandth
of a Q = 10 15 Btu). This can also be expressed as
gigawatts-electric of base-load capacity equivalent, at a
75 p er cent capacity factor, or in kilowatt-hours of
electricity generated at a given (34 per cent) conversion
efficiency. Figure 4 (page 32) shows the corresponding
shifts in the nonelectric sector, from PETG to shale and
SYN F and then to ELH Y. The area under the domestic
PETG curve corresponds to the two-quad resource base.
The units of measure are quads or million barrels per
day (oe). Note that the shaded area represents the re
quirements for old oil- and gas-fired generating units.
Figures 3 and 4 may be lite rally interpreted as show
ing a gradual shift to a " hydrogen economy." Alter
natively, one could interpret them as indicating a rapid
shift toward an "all-electric economy .'' Needless to say,
the transi tion indicated is sensitive to the comparative
costs of nuclear-gen erated and coal-generated
electricity. Electricity demand would change from the
base case if the FBR were delayed indefinitely and coal
costs remained constant. Such an extreme departure
from the base case would have major consequences.
Under those conditions, coal consumption in 2015 would
rise dramatically from 75 quads (u nde r base case as
sumptions) to 180 quads if coal costs remained constant
and the FBR were absent.
By presenting the base case resu lts in some detail , it is
not our intent to argue that a firm commitment is war
ranted at this time to an all-electric or an all-hydrogen
economy. Rather, it is ro underscore the fact that in the
foreseeable future a much greater reliance on both coa l
and nuclear energy will be required to sustain the
general economy.
Finally, we wish to observe that the risi ng energy
prices given by the base case calculations lead to energy
demand growth rates significantly lower than those of
the past. This is shown in Figure 5 (page 33 ), where for
the sake of comparison we have included points obtained
by the Ford Foundation Energy Policy P roject.
Interestingly enough, our model suggests that the uncer
tainty of knowing whether our ultimate domestic PETG
reserves will be two quads or three quads has little effect
upon demand projections until shortly before the ye;~r
2000. Presumably, in the interval, continued effort in ex
ploration and production will indicate more reliably
which of these two assumptions lies closer to the truth .
In the absence of relief from rising real energy prices, w<::
expect strong market responses in the direct ion or energy
conservation. Technological advances that promise
energy savings (such as solar-assisted heating and cool
ing, and improved auto efficiencies) are likely to be
adopted b y the public if energy prices continue to rise.

table (page 34) on "Benefits of New Technologies" we
show the interdependence between the economic
benefits of these two technologies. The two center
columns of figures in the table refer to the base c;~se
results, where we assume that two qu ads PETG a re
available and that coal costs rise with utilization. I n th e
absence or the FBR , economywide energy costs would
rise by $26 billion at a 10 pe r cent annual discount rate
and by $435 billion at a 5 percent annual discou nt r<~tc.
Including the FBR but excluding SYNF would result in
a cost penalty of $8 billion at a I0 per cent annual dis
count rate. The two technologies, however, are partial
substitutes for each other. Th<ll is, total costs would in
crease by $47 billion if neither were ava ilable during the
time horizon of our analysis and the annual discount
rate were I0 per cent.
Numbe rs in the two lerthand columns illustrate the
extreme case, in which coal costs remain constant, in
dependent of utilization rates. As expected, SYNF
benefits in that case rise dramatically, while FBR
benefits drop. Once more, the joint be nefit of both
technologies together exceeds the sum of the individual
contributions. On the other hand, the benefits of YNF
are damped significantly if three quads PET G are as
sumed. (See the two righthand columns of the table.) In
that case, the introdu c tion of high-cost SY NF
technology could be delayed by another dec;~d c after
1990. The basic mess;~ge of these figures is that, in the
absence of reliable knowledge or u ltimate oil and gas
reserves, of ultimate uranium reserves, and the cost or
coal with increased use, both SYN F and FB R
technologies represent valuable forms of insurance
a~ainst future energy shortages.
~ ~-------------------------------------,
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Be n efits of Future T echnologies
We are concerned principally with two future
technologies: SYNF, dependent on coal, and F BR ,
which essentially decouples the dependence of the
nuclear option from the availability of uranium. In the
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Figure 5 Total energy dtmtnd to the year 2000
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Economic Costs of a Nuclear
Moratoriu m

binalzon oft hose energy supply and conservtltion options
that a re assumed to be available. In the base case. for ex.

The model used for these benefit-cost analyses can
also be applied to quantify the economic costs of a
nationwide nuclear moratorium. T his is done by
Ct~lculating the difference between the economy" ide
costs of meeting energy demands with and without
nuclear power . We define a m or(ltorium as a situ(ltion in
which the total installed capaciry of L\\R 's in the
United tates is lim ited to ;)0 gigawatts-electric, a level
th;H will be reached before 1980.
To offset a nuclear moratorium , it would not be
realistic to rely upon the advanced technologies (solar o r
fusion o r both) until the 21st ce ntury. Moreover, it
would not be politically pn1dent to rely upon fu rther in
creases in our imports of oil and gas. For the next twent y
to forty years, this leaves us with just two alternatives to
nuclea r energy: (1) heavy reliance upon coal for the
production of both electricity and synthetic fuels, and
(2) conservation, induced by sharp rises in energy prices.
Both routes a re expensive.
T he mode l a utomatically selects a minimal-cost mm

amp le, it woul d b e optimal for coal consumption to rise
far more r(lpidly than it has in the past- qundrupling
from I 970 to 2000. In the cvem of a nuclear moratorium,
coal consumption would ha\·e to rise sixfold over this
period, to reach 75 quads by the year 2000. II is hi~hh
doubtful that this could be accomplished in an en·
vironmentally a nd economically sound fashion.
Conservt~tion cou ld reduce energy demands, but it too
ht~s a cost- one that can be inferred indirectly from th~
price consumers are willing to pay for energy rather than
do without it. For example, as shown in Figure 6 ( pa~~
35 ), with nuclear energy available (the base case as
sumption ), in the year 2000 the price of electricity would
be $24 per I 0 3 kilowatt-hours a nd the quantity
demanded would be 6.6 trillion kilowatt-hours. With a
mora torium, the cost of electricity would rise to $38 per
1()3 kilowa tt -hours. This price rise would induce conser
vation, and dem<~nd would be e xpected to drop by 19
pe r cent.
For the year 2000, the costs of a nuclea r moratorium
- the loss in "consumers' surplus," due to higher

BENEFITS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ($ BILLIONS}a

Rising
c
Coal Costs

Constant b
Coal Costs
Total Amount of Oil and
Gas Available Domestically

Annual discount rate
FBR benefits
SYNF benefits
FBR + SYNF (combined}
benefits

34

2Qd

10%

3Qe

2Qd

5%

10%

5%

10%

5%

4

123

26

435

15

270

103

176

8

0

3

0

''

:r
127

587

47

449

22

277

a.

Present values of the differences in economywide energy costs, with and
without the specified technology, excluding R&D costs , discounted to
1975.

b.

Coal costs remain $1/MM Btu, regardless of the amount consumed.

c.

Coal costs remain constant at $1/MM Btu up to an annual consumption rate
of 25 quads (twice the 1970 level} . Thereafter , they rise linearly to $2
at 50 quads, $3 at 75 quads and so on. This is the base case assumptipn.

d.

18
Q ~ lo stu.
production.

e.

3Q is equivalent to 68 year s of supply at 1970 rate of production .

2Q is equivalent to 45 years of suppl y at 1970 rate of
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ELECTRICITY PRICES

Project ed conseq uences of a nuclear moratoriu m in year 2000

electric ity prices - would b e a pproximately $80 billio n.
Disco unting a nd su mming o ver a ll fu ture years, the tota l
costs would a mo unt to mo re tha n $300 billio n a t a 10 per
cent a nnua l discount rate a nd $2,500 billion at a 5 pe r
cent annua l discou nt r ate. This is our best est imate o f
the cost of shifting t o a predomina ntly coal-based a nd
oonserva t ion-orie nte d economy. Nearly ha lf of these
costs wo uld be reflected in e ach m onth's reside ntia I
electric ity bills. The r em a inder would be paid in th e
form of higher prices for a ll goods and services tha t con
sume e lectricity.

Two addi tiona l remarks s hould be m a de. Firs t, s ince
our mo de l assumes a g iven ra te o f income g rowth. th e
damping effect of rising energy prices o n the genera l
eco nomy is not considered . If it were, the overa ll
economic cost o f a m orator ium could b e st ilt higher. Sec
ond , one sho uld a lso compa r e ou r numbers with es
tima tes that have been m a de of poss ible d a m ages
resulting from a catastr ophic accidem fo llowing a cor e
me ltdown. In t his m a nner, one could the n begin to com
pa re the costs a nd benefit s of a na tio na l n uclear
m or a torium.

The Past as Prologue
For some time now, Washington bureaucrats have been holding staff
meetings in an attempt to find methods for conserving energy by cutting
waste. According to a memorandum that followed one such meeting , "It is
estimated that 20 per cent (of the fuel consumed) can be saved if car
buretors are properly adjusted, if cars are started more slowly, and if their
rate of speed is such as to get the fullest possible use out of the gasoline.
"I also wanted to ascertain whether people driving back and forth to
work could not double up with others who use their automobiles for this
purpose. Questionnaires have been distributed through the department
... We may be able to improve parking conditions .. . "
The memo came from the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes. It was
dated June 13, 1941.
According to Marcus Aurelius, "That which comes after ever conforms
to that which has gone before."
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